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i 
Executive summary 
 
1. The paper utilises the variation introduced by the piloting of the Education 
Maintenance Allowance (EMA) programme to estimate wider impacts of 
education in terms of reduced crime. 
 
2. The EMA programme was piloted in some Local Education Authorities (LEAs) 
of England, creating a quasi-experimental setting. It is possible to evaluate 
changes in crime before and after the introduction of the programme between 
those areas where the programme was implemented and other areas in the 
country.  
 
3. This methodology would be robust to estimating a ‘true’ effect of the EMA 
programme on crime reduction assuming random assignment and comparability 
between those LEAs that introduced the EMA programme and those that didn’t. 
This is, however, not the case.  
 
4. Areas that introduced the EMA have, on average, higher crime rates. This 
implies a non -random assignment of the EMA programme. We deal with this 
issue by including controls in our estimations.  
 
5. A further complication arises from the fact that areas that introduced the EMA 
programme are likely to have been selected as action areas for other crime 
initiatives. Therefore, what seems to be an externality of an educational 
programme may be induced by the combination of other direct and indirect 
initiatives to reduce crime. We analyse the combined effects of the Home 
Office’s Reducing Burglary Initiative (RBI) and the EMA programme of the 
Department for Education and Skills.  
 
6. Data were gathered from different sources. The Offenders Index dataset were 
utilised to generate indicators of juvenile crimes. Juvenile crimes are measured 
by the number of convictions due to violent crimes, burglaries and thefts in each 
LEA. Educational data by LEA came from the LEA School Information System 
and economic, demographic and census information by LEA from the Office of 
National Statistics.  
 
7. Using difference-in-differences estimation techniques, this paper shows that 
burglary convictions by males aged 16 to 18 in areas piloted by the EMA 
programme fell by significantly more after the introduction of the programme 
relative to the change in other Local Education Authorities (LEA). The relative 
reduction in burglary rates is about 1 less conviction per 1,000 pupils in EMA 
areas relative to other LEAs. 
 
8. We also find that, without the inclusion of statistical controls, convictions for 
thefts were reduced by nearly 2 per 1,000 pupils in EMA areas relative to non-
EMA areas. The estimated reduction is consistent across several specifications, 
but not statistically significant when area-level controls are included.  
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9. We do not find a significant difference in convictions for violent crimes for 
EMA areas. This result is in line with our prior hypothesis. 
 
10. We re-estimated the analysis for older individuals to establish whether there was 
a general reduction in crime across all age groups or whether it was specific to 
the EMA target group, i.e. those aged 16 to 18. Our results show a reduction in 
burglary for young people aged 19 to 21 in EMA areas relative to other LEAs 
but this is explained by general trend differences between EMA areas and other 
LEAs. Once these trends are accounted for there are no declines in burglary 
convictions for those aged 19 to 21. For the population older than 21 years there 
are no significant differences in burglary rates in EMA areas relative to other 
LEAs. These findings suggest that burglary reduction occurred mainly for 16 to 
18 year old males in line with the explanation that the effects are due to the 
EMA programme.  
 
11. When we analyse the effect of the Reducing Burglary Initiative in conjunction 
with the EMA programme, we find that in LEAs where the RBI and the EMA 
were introduced jointly, burglary rates fell between 1.1 and 1.5 offences per 
1,000 pupils relative to areas that did not introduce any of these policies. The 
reduction in areas that introduced only the EMA programme or only the RBI 
was not significantly different from that in other LEAs.  
 
12. This paper highlights the importance of connections between government 
programmes for young people, such as the EMA and the RBI, and demonstrates 
the high levels of potential social benefit that may flow from programmes that 
recognise the connections between key agencies, government departments and 
stakeholders. The paper also shows the capability of education provision in 
meeting wide-ranging policy objectives. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Education is a potentially large influence on individual propensities to offend and 
possibly an important source of area-level variation in crime rates. Crime statistics for 
England indicate that crime rates are lower in areas with higher levels of education, 
which are also areas of higher per capita income and contain a higher proportion of 
families belonging to the highest socio-economic status (Home Office, 2003). 
Whether the association between education and crime is causal, or whether it masks a 
number of possible effects that may not be due to education, is less clear.  
 
The empirical literature on the economic incentives to commit crime has made 
progress in dealing with the issue of causality of crime outcomes. Machin and Meghir 
(2000) use panel data to look at cross-area changes in crime across areas in relation to 
changes in wage distribution for the 25th lowest percentile. They found a negative 
association between falling wages and increased instances of theft and handling of 
stolen goods, even after controlling for other variables including demographic change 
and measures of deterrence. They found a similar association for changes in burglary, 
vehicle and property crime and changes in low wages. Similarly Witt, Clarke and 
Fielding (1999), using police force area data in England and Wales from 1988 to 
1996, find that wage inequality changes are positively correlated with changes in 
crime.  
 
Recent findings by Hansen and Machin (2004) show robust evidence that changes in 
minimum wages affect crime rates. They use the introduction of the national 
minimum wage in the UK as a quasi-experiment to look at crime rates before and 
after the introduction of the policy. The introduction of a minimum wage to a 
previously unregulated labour market provided substantial pay rises to low-waged 
workers. Comparing levels in crime by police force area before and after the 
introduction of the minimum wage regulation, they show that economic incentives 
produced a significant reduction in crime. In a different approach to economic 
incentives, Machin and Marie (2004) investigate how changes in benefits affect 
unemployment and how this in turn can predict crime. Using a similar design, they 
show that in areas more affected by the Jobseeker’s Allowance, i.e. less claimants, 
crime rose by more. Their results seem to suggest that benefit cuts may well have 
caused individuals previously on the margins to engage in crime. 
 
These latter analyses look at government policies aimed to change the labour market’s 
economic incentives and evaluate their impact on crime reduction. In particular, these 
investigations look at changes in crime rates before and after the introduction of the 
government policy and compare changes in crime rates between areas. Although this 
methodology has been applied to policies that affect wages or unemployment benefits, 
it has rarely been applied to educational policies. In the UK, a number of policies have 
been introduced to improve participation in further education such as transport cost 
subsidies, childcare assistance for teenage parents and weekly payments to help with 
the cost of learning (DfES, 2004). If indeed education does have any effect on crime, 
then one would expect that participating in education would reduce the likelihood of 
being involved in criminal activities. Hence, one may expect a significant reduction in 
crime in areas where targeted educational policies for vulnerable groups have been 
introduced as compared to areas where such policies have not been introduced.  
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In estimating the effects of education on crime using non-experimental data, Lochner 
and Moretti (2004) use instrumental variable techniques to estimate the effect of high 
school graduation on participation in criminal activities in the US. They use the 
exogenous variation induced by changes in state post-compulsory school attendance 
as an instrument to high school graduation. They find that completing high school 
reduces the probability of incarceration by about 0.76 percentage points for whites 
and 3.4 percentage points for blacks. They find that the most significant consequence 
of increased graduation is a reduction in violent crime, assaults and motor vehicle 
thefts. Interestingly, their results suggest that endogeneity of schooling decisions does 
not appear to bias estimates of the effects of education on crime. In other words, the 
possibility that the association between education and crime may be due to 
unobservable factors that affect both outcomes appears to be, if any, small.  
 
Educational programmes in the US have proved to have external benefits. For 
example, the Quantum Opportunity Program (QOP) was designed to increase the 
likelihood that youths would complete high school and enter a further education and 
training programme. The programme was also intended to improve the youth’s grades 
and achievement test scores and to reduce risky behaviours such as substance abuse, 
crime and teenage childbearing (Taggart, 1995). The programme enrolled youths from 
disadvantaged backgrounds, especially those with a high probability of dropping out 
from high school. The implementation of the programme provided the students with a 
tutor and supplementary school activities with educational and community projects. 
Financial incentives were also designed to encourage high school graduation. Two 
years after the programme’s completion, randomly assigned participants were 34 
percent more likely to achieve high school diploma and criminal activity, in the form 
of number of times arrested, was 28 percent lower than non-participants (Penn, 2000). 
This last result, however, is not consistent across all areas, e.g. in Philadelphia crime 
increased whereas in Washington crime remained unchanged (Maxfield et al., 2003)  
 
In this paper we explore the relationship between education and crime using a natural 
experimental setting. We evaluate the Educational Maintenance Allowances (EMA)–a 
Department for Education and Skills (DfES) programme designed to increase 
participation in post-compulsory education – on juvenile crime reduction. To do this, 
we first address the theoretical reasons why education can have an effect on crime 
reduction (Section 2) and the methodology to evaluate them (Section 3). We then 
present the results from our estimates of the change in conviction rates for burglary, 
thefts and violent crimes, for 16 to 18 year old males, in EMA areas relative to other 
areas (Section 4).  
 
To validate our results, we perform two sensitivity tests. The first test aims to capture 
the age-specific conviction rates’ reduction (Section 4.2). If indeed the EMA is having 
an effect on crime, it will be through shifting 16 to 18 year old youths away from 
criminal activities or potential criminal activities and into education. The second test 
aims to capture the possibility that other crime reduction initiatives were in action in 
EMA areas and that the EMA is a confounder for the effect of these other initiatives 
(Section 4.3). In particular, we explore the Reducing Burglary Initiative: a crime 
prevention programme introduced by the Home Office in England and Wales around 
the same time that the EMA were being piloted. We lay out conclusions from this 
research in Section 5.  
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2. Theoretical framework 
 
There are a number of theoretical reasons why the provision of education may have an 
effect on crime. Feinstein (2002) reports five potential channels where education can 
have an effect on individuals’ criminal behaviour: income, parenting, pleasure, 
patience and risk aversion. For the case of income, education may increase the 
expected value of legal work earning, which raises the opportunity cost of time spent 
engaged in criminal activities. Education also increases the cost associated with 
incarceration, since it increases the value of any time foregone (Lochner, 2004). 
 
In terms of parenting, education could have effects on parenting skills, which have 
implications for the criminality of their children (Rutter et al. 1998). For example, 
parenting skills such as erratic or harsh discipline, low supervision or maternal 
rejection have been shown to be associated with subsequent criminal involvement.  
 
Pleasure from criminal activity is another channel by which education may have 
effects, particularly since pleasure is the other one of the main determinants of 
juvenile crime (Farrington, 2001). Education may be important for teenagers in terms 
of limiting opportunities for participating in criminal activity. This could be a simple 
matter of time allocation (i.e. the custodial function of education) or, more subtle, an 
effect on peer group membership, with subsequent implications for behaviours, 
including criminology. Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2004) developed a theoretical 
model of crime decision where delinquents influence each others’ decisions, both 
positively and negatively. They find that peer group effects can give rise to multiple 
equilibria, where individuals connected to a network can end up with different 
outcomes: either in employment, as isolated criminals or within a network of 
criminals. However, evidence on the effects of peer groups is mixed.  
 
The learning benefit from education may influence crime through effects on patience 
and risk aversion (Lochner and Moretti, 2001). Education increases patience, which 
reduces the discount rate of future earnings and hence reduces the propensity to 
commit crimes.  
 
In terms of risk aversion, education may increase risk aversion, which, in turn, 
increases the weight given by individuals to the possible punishment and hence 
reduces the likelihood of committing crimes. Education may also affect the decision 
to engage in crime by impacting on maturity and development of youths (Hirschi and 
Gottfredson, 1995).  
 
Finally, education may also have a direct effect on crime. For instance, education 
increases the earnings that one can derive from crime and the tools learnt in school 
may be inappropriately used for criminal activities. In this sense, education may have 
an upward effect on crime (Levitt and Lochner, 2000).  
 
From the reasons mentioned above, it is further expected that an educational 
programme, which encourages participation through income support, will have 
additional effects on crime reduction. One of the most cited reasons to engage in 
criminal activities is to gain money (Palmer et al., 2002). The EMA could, at least 
partially, tackle the income-related need for youths to engage in crime since those 
supported by the programme receive a weekly allowance, an attendance bonus 
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payment each term and an end-of-course achievement payment as long as they attend 
a course leading to a qualification. Therefore, eligible youths can use their allowance 
to satisfy their needs. 
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3. Methodology 
 
One of the main difficulties for empirical research is the identification of a causal 
effect. A simple correlation between education and crime may reflect a number of 
unobservable characteristics affecting both variables. Methods currently utilised in 
research to deal with the selectivity bias of education include Instrumental Variables 
(IV) and/or Fixed Effects (FE). The first method uses a variable, called an instrument, 
which predicts education but does not predict crime. Finding such an instrument, 
however, has proven to be troublesome (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000). FE methods 
make use of panel data available and eliminate the bias in education induced by 
unobservable factors that do not change over time. FE, however, is not robust to the 
possibility that time-variant unobservable factors may still influence education and 
crime (Hsiao, 2003).  
 
Another method used is the Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM), which also 
makes use of data over time. With this method, past values of the explanatory 
variable, in this case education, are used as instruments of current education. One of 
the problems with using this method here is the availability of educational data. The 
ideal measurement of education would be learning, so that past learning serves as the 
instrument to predict current learning.  
 
Another method is the examination of policies or pilot programmes that allow 
evaluation of effects using a quasi-experimental setting. In this quasi-experimental 
setting, we may infer that changes in educational outcomes resulted from a 
government policy. It is possible to look at what happened to the outcome before and 
after this policy change. This is the approach that we follow in this paper, with the 
EMA pilots providing a natural experiment. 
 
The piloting of Education Maintenance Allowances (EMA) began in September 1999 
in 15 Local Education Authority areas1, with a view to raising participation, retention 
and achievement in post-compulsory education among 16-18 year olds.  
 
The EMA programme was piloted in areas with low participation in post-16 
education. These areas are also known to have higher levels of deprivation, more 
families renting rather than owning their accommodation and a greater proportion of 
individuals without qualifications and whose parents experience high labour market 
inactivity.  
 
The 15 pilots introduced four models of the main EMA including: varying the terms 
of the weekly amount of EMA available, to whom it is paid and amounts which are 
paid for retention and achievement bonuses.  
 
                                                 
1 LEA areas where the EMA was piloted are: Middlesbrough, Walsall, Southampton, Cornwall, Leeds, 
Lambeth, Southwark, Lewisham, Greenwich, Oldham, City of Nottingham, Bolton, Doncaster, Stoke-
on-Trent, and Gateshead.  
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Table 1: Design and coverage of main EMA pilot areas 
 
Model LEA Pilot areas Awards 
Variant 1 Middlesborough, Walsall, 
Southampton, Cornwall, 
Leeds, Inner London 
(Lambeth, Southwark, 
Lewisham, Greenwich). 
£30 per week plus £50 
retention and £50 
achievement bonus 
Variant 2 Oldham, Nottingham £40 per week plus £50 
retention and £50 
achievement bonus 
Variant 3 Bolton, Doncaster £30 per week paid to 
parents plus £50 retention 
and £50 achievement 
bonus 
Variant 4 Stoke-on-Trent, Gateshead £30 per week plus £80 
retention and £140 
achievement bonus. 
 
 
In September 2004 EMA became a national scheme in which £30, £20 or £10 per 
week is paid directly to the young person depending on household income. It is paid 
in addition to any Child Benefit that is claimed for a young person in post-16 
education. The national scheme includes retention bonuses worth up to £500 per year, 
however it does not include an achievement bonus. The national scheme also uses a 
central assessment and payment body, rather than the Local Education Authorities. 
 
Ashworth et al. (2001 and 2002) and Heaver at al. (2002), in their evaluations of the 
first two years of the EMA programme indicate that overall, 63% of young people in 
low income families in pilot areas applied to the EMA programme in the first year and 
applications for the second year increased slightly by just 0.6 percentage points. The 
majority of the applications for the EMA were made by young people who continued 
with full-time education. However, 11% of eligible people who were in work or 
training, 15% who were categorised as unemployed or looking for a job and 23% of 
those who identified themselves as undertaking another activity such as looking after 
the home or the family had applied. The EMA programme is estimated to have had a 
significant impact on participation in education in urban areas and to have had a larger 
effect for young men.  
 
Ashworth et al. also indicate that, despite the relative success of the LEAs where the 
EMA programme was piloted to publicise the programme, 37% of income eligible 
families in the pilot areas, with young people both in and out of full-time education, 
had not applied for the EMA during year one. This percentage was reduced during the 
second year due to an increase in public awareness of the availability of the 
programme. Given that eligibility for financial support depends on parental income 
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and that not all eligible youths applied for the programme, any positive externality of 
the programme is likely to be biased downwards.  
 
There may be effects of the EMA programme on youth crime through changes in 
educational participation with subsequent benefits for youth in terms of income, peer 
group memberships and social inclusion. The EMA provides a direct income effect on 
crime reduction due to the income support provided to youths. Moreover, 
participation in education induces a trade-off in time allocation between participation 
in criminal activities and education. This may be of particular importance for crime 
that requires market skills and planning, such as burglary, but perhaps not so much for 
crimes that require little market skills such as handling stolen goods or drug dealing.  
 
Participation in education may also have long-term implications. According to 
Lochner (2004), an educational policy aimed at increasing schooling is likely to 
reduce crime more in the long-term than in the short-term by increasing skill levels. 
The accumulation of skills over time increases the opportunity cost of engaging in 
criminal activities, so the expected effects of schooling are likely to be greater as 
individuals age.  
 
3.1 Data 
 
Crime data come from the Home Office Offenders Index database (OI). The OI 
contains a history of criminal convictions from 1963 from England and Wales. The 
sample of individuals is a census of all court cases that occur during four weeks of the 
year. The sampling weeks are the first week of March, the second week of June, the 
third week of September, and the third week of November. Once a person is sampled, 
the complete history of prosecutions and convictions are recorded and remains part of 
the sample in case of any future court appearance. The period used for this paper is 
from 1996 to 2002. 
 
The OI contains information on the type of offence for which the individual has been 
convicted and on individuals’ characteristics such as age, gender and ethnicity. As it is 
a court-based system, there is no information on dates of offending. There is also no 
information on unsuccessful prosecutions and cautions. Therefore the combination of 
age, gender and type of offence allows us to generate specific indicators of 
convictions, for example male burglary committed by 16 year olds.  
 
Educational data for Local Education Authorities (LEA) come from the LEA School 
Information System (LEASIS). Information in LEASIS is at school level. We used the 
location of the schools to establish their location within the 150 current LEAs. Then 
information was aggregated, and weighted averages of educational variables 
calculated. We gathered information on total number of pupils, full-time equivalent 
number of qualified teachers, percentage of children eligible for free school meals, 
pupil-teacher ratio, full-time equivalent number of supplementary staff for ethnic 
minorities, percentage of 15 year olds achieving 5 or more GCSE A to C, percentage 
of 15 year olds not achieving GCSE and percentage of secondary students with 
unauthorised half-days missed. 
 
Two particular data issues needed to be resolved. First, it was necessary to 
homogenise educational information using the current classification of 150 LEAs in 
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England. Classification of LEA changed between 1997 and 1998. From having 109 
LEAs in England in 1996 there are now 150 today. Large LEAs were divided into 
smaller authorities, in some cases up to 4 or 5 smaller units. By using the current 
classification of LEAs we are able to identify all areas in which the Education 
Maintenance Allowance programmes were piloted. 
 
Secondly, it is important to calculate age-specific crime rates because the outflow 
from the education system represents an addition to the human capital stock but the 
effect of change in the flow in the overall crime will be severely limited. Rather, we 
calculate conviction rates for each cohort of adolescents able to leave full-time 
education at age 16. These age-specific conviction rates can be explained, in part, by 
the educational success of the cohort.  
 
With the OI data we aggregate offences to the LEA-level. Linking petty crime areas, 
the area where the court has jurisdiction, to LEAs was not simple. Some magistrates 
courts have changed over time, merging with others. Additionally, we assume that no 
offences are committed across regions. This is a reasonable assumption for large 
areas, especially for juvenile crime. However, for the case of London, we combined 
13 LEAs and respective courts into 4 main zones (North-East, North-West, South-
East and South-West London). Three other LEAs had to be combined to match with 
the court level data. These were Bournemouth and Dorset; Bracknell Forest, Slough, 
Windsor and Maidenhead and Wokingham; and Essex, Southend and Thurrock. 
Without including the LEA for the City of London we were left with 132 areas for the 
analysis, 12 of which received EMA support.  
 
For each LEA we obtained information on convictions for burglary, theft and violent 
crimes committed by 16 year old males between 1996 and 2002. We obtained the 
same data for offences committed by 17 year olds between 1997 and 2002 and for 18 
year olds between 1998 and 2002. Property and violent crime are typically high for 
teenagers, typically reaching a peak during late teenage years. Burglary includes 
breaking into, or attempts to break into, residential and non-residential properties. 
Theft includes stealing vehicles or from vehicles and shoplifting or handling stolen 
goods. The most common violent crimes include murder, cruelty to children, child 
abduction, kidnapping, rioting, endangering wildlife or sea life, endangering railway 
passengers and procuring illegal abortion. 
 
We evaluate the externalities of the EMA programme for different types of 
convictions, i.e. burglary, theft and violent crime. This is because the decision to 
engage in a delinquent activity such as burglary or theft is different than for violent 
crime. Even between burglary and theft there may be differences; although these may 
be more subtle. For example, burglary requires more time and knowledge of the target 
property whereas stealing a mobile phone may depend more on opportunistic 
circumstances. Grouping offences into burglary, theft and violent crimes in the OI 
data takes into account any changes in offence codes and disposal or sentencing codes 
between 1996 and 2002 to obtain a consistent treatment of the data over time (Home 
Office, 1998). 
 
Finally, the total number of convictions per LEA is standardised using the number of 
pupils aged 15 by LEA. In order to account for changes due to population mobility, 
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the growth rate of population aged 15 to 19 by LEA was applied it to the 15 year old 
pupils. Therefore, conviction rates are measured per 1,000 pupils.  
 
3.2 Estimation 
 
To evaluate the effects of the EMA programme on our indicator for juvenile crime we 
applied difference-in-differences techniques. We assessed the changes in male, 
juvenile conviction rates before and after EMA piloting in treatment and non-
treatment LEAs by: 
 
φ=∆−∆
∆=−∆=− −−
NEMA
at
EMA
at
NEMA
at
NEMA
at
NEMA
at
EMA
at
EMA
at
EMA
at
CC
CCCCCC 11     and       (1) 
 
where a stands for LEA area, t is time, EMA denotes areas where the EMA 
programme was piloted and NEMA non-EMA LEAs. In this paper t-1 covers 1996 to 
1999 and t 1999 to 2002. 
 
The difference in these differences (φ ) is an estimate of the effect of the EMA 
programme on male, juvenile convictions. This estimate is unbiased when the 
programme is introduced randomly so that there are no differences between treatment 
and non-treatment areas with respect to conviction rates (Sherman at al., 1998). 
However, this is not the case here since the selection of LEA areas to participate in the 
EMA pilot was not random. Areas were chosen that were known to have relatively 
high levels of deprivation, low participation rates in post-16 education and low levels 
of attainment in Year 11 examinations (Ashworth et al, 2001). These areas are also 
areas with high juvenile crime and high conviction rates.  
 
One way of handling this potential bias is to introduce controls for the characteristics 
of areas, estimating an equation of the form: 
 
atataaat uXPolicyOnTTC ++++= −1* ϕφβα     (2) 
 
where Ta is a binary dummy variable indicating areas that piloted the EMA 
programme and PolicyOn is a binary dummy variable indicating periods after the 
introduction of the EMA. The parameter φ  is the difference in means before and after 
policy introduction, i.e. the difference-in-differences. This will be biased (in a 
treatment-control policy evaluation setting) if β is estimated to be non-zero, and in 
particular if it is positive as when the policy was introduced to high crime areas. The 
matrix X contains area-level characteristics which are incorporated in the estimation 
to remove the initial difference in treatment versus non-treatment LEAs, evaluated by 
β.  
 
However, even after having a similar initial baseline in convictions, there could be 
different pre-policy conviction trends across areas where the EMA was implemented 
and the rest of the LEAs. This may still cause a serious bias to the difference-in-
differences estimate using equation (2). One way to control for this issue is to add 
linear time trends as controls to equation (2). 
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There are some issues regarding the validity of our estimates. Firstly, the EMA 
programme was piloted in 15 LEAs in 1999. After the first two years, the programme 
was extended to approximately one-third of the LEAs in England. If these areas have 
a large reduction in convictions, the parameter φ  may be biased. We attempt to check 
how robust our initial estimate of the difference-in-differences is by re-estimating the 
model excluding these areas.  
 
Another way to control for the rolling-over of the EMA programme is to include a 
control for the areas where the programme was rolled over. Therefore, we estimate the 
equation:  
 
atatbaaat uXPolicyOnTPolicyOnTTC +++++= −12211 ** ϕφφβα  (3) 
 
where 1 stands for the original 15 LEA where the EMA programme was piloted in 
1999 and 2 stands for the LEAs where the programme was rolled over in 2001.  
 
After estimating the difference-in-differences parameter we perform two sensitivity 
analyses. First, analysis by age group is done to verify if indeed the EMA programme 
had an effect on reducing conviction rates for the targeted group. In other words, we 
expect that any external benefits of the EMA programme will be captured by a decline 
in convictions for people aged 16 to 18, but not so for older individuals. This 
sensitivity analysis is performed for males aged 19 to 21 and also for males aged 20 to 
69. 
 
Second, our estimates are not robust to the possibility that the introduction of other 
programmes in these LEAs could account for any observed differences between EMA 
and non-EMA areas. These may be programmes designed to combat crime, such as 
the Street Crime Initiative (SCI) or the Reducing Burglary Initiative (RBI), or 
economic programmes that have been shown to have knock-on effects on crime, such 
as the Jobseeker’s Allowance.  
 
Of particular interest is the introduction of the RBI in 1999. The aim of this initiative 
was to reduce burglary nationally by targeting areas with the worst domestic burglary 
problems. Some of these areas also introduced the EMA programme. In this case, we 
can capture the effect of EMA areas, RBI areas and both EMA-RBI areas on 
conviction rates by using the following equation: 
 
atatiaiiaiat uXPolicyOnTTC ++++= −1* ϕφβα     (4) 
 
where i = {EMA programme, RBI programme, EMA-RBI programmes}. This means 
that there are three difference-in-differences estimators, one for areas that 
implemented the EMA programme only, another for areas that introduced the RBI 
only and, finally, another for areas that introduced both programmes.  
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4. Results 
 
Table 2 presents results from the difference-in-differences estimates without controls 
using equation (1). Convictions considered are for males aged 16 to 18 in terms of 
whether they were prosecuted and convicted for (i) violent crime, (ii) burglary, and 
(iii) theft. 
 
Table 2: Difference in juvenile convictions (16 to 18 year old males) per 1,000 
pupils 
 
Before 
EMA
After 
EMA
Within Group 
Difference
EMA Areas Violent 1.645 1.468 -0.177 
(0.180)
 Burglary 4.219 2.230 -1.989 
(0.379)***
 Theft 14.366 9.563 -4.803
(1.102)***
Non-EMA Areas Violent 1.137 0.977 -0.160
(0.045)***
 Burglary 2.227 1.176 -1.051
(0.098)***
 Theft 7.643 4.817 -2.826
(0.260)***
    
Difference-in-
differences
Between Group 
Difference 
Violent 0.509
(0.227)**
0.491
(0.203)**
-0.017
(0.179)
 
Burglary 1.991
(0.673)***
1.054
(0.525)**
-0.937
(0.377)**
 
Theft 6.723
(2.923)**
4.746
(2.007)**
-1.977
(1.091)*
Note: Estimation based on 15 areas where the EMA programme was piloted. “Before EMA” is defined 
as 1996 to 1999 and “After EMA” as post 1999. Asterisks (*),(**),(***) represent significance at 10, 5 
and 1 percent levels, respectively. Estimations are weighted by population. Standard errors, in 
parenthesis, are clustered by LEA. 
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Table 2 shows a clear decline in juvenile convictions in all local education authority 
areas. The exception is for convictions due to violent crimes for which there is no 
significant change in EMA areas. The difference-in-differences estimator calculates 
difference in conviction rates both within and between EMA and non-EMA areas. For 
burglary rates committed by male youths aged 16 to 18, there is a reduction of 0.937 
crimes per 1,000 pupils in EMA areas relative to non-EMA areas. The extra relative 
reduction for theft among 16 to 18 year old males is nearly 2. These reductions are 
significantly different from zero at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. However, 
there are no differences in convictions for violent crime in EMA relative to non-EMA 
areas.  
 
Results from the difference-in-differences estimate in convictions by EMA and non-
EMA areas obtained in Table 2 are also illustrated in Figure 1. This figure shows 
trends in conviction rates for burglary, theft and violent crimes in EMA and non-EMA 
areas. Trends are divided into pre- and post- introduction of the EMA programme (in 
1999). Between-group differences in conviction rates are illustrated by comparing 
trends between EMA and non-EMA areas. Within-group differences are illustrated by 
comparing trends in EMA before and after 1999 and similarly for non-EMA areas. 
The difference-in-difference is the change in conviction rates in EMA areas before 
and after the introduction of the programme relative to the same change for other 
LEAs.  
 
Using the above explanation, the burglary rate falls more in EMA areas after the 
introduction of the pilots relative to other LEAs (-0.937). Similarly, the theft rate also 
falls more rapidly in EMA areas relative to non-EMA areas (-1.977), however the fall 
in conviction rates for violent crimes in EMA areas after the introduction of the 
programme is not significantly different from other LEAs (-0.017). The figures also 
make clear how EMA areas differ from the rest of the LEAs in terms of conviction 
rates, with higher burglary, theft, and violent crimes conviction rates in EMA relative 
to non-EMA areas. 
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Figure 1: Trends in convictions in EMA and non-EMA areas 
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Using equation (2) and regression analysis we then test the difference-in-differences 
estimate controlling for other area level information (Table 3). The first column is the 
difference-in-differences estimate with no controls, and shows there to be a significant 
reduction in burglary and thefts in EMA areas relative to non-EMA areas (-0.94 and -
1.98, respectively). Notice that these estimates correspond to the ones previously 
estimated in Table 2 under the heading difference-in-difference. It also shows that 
burglary and theft rates were higher in EMA areas before the introduction of the 
programme (1.99 and 6.72, respectively). These estimates correspond to the between 
group difference prior to the introduction of the EMA programme in Table 2. 
 
We include controls in the estimation to reduce the coefficient β to zero. This 
coefficient indicates the non-random allocation of the EMA programme to areas with 
low participation in post-compulsory education. In order to condition out some of this 
initial difference, estimates in Table 3 use the following measures of area 
characteristics: 
 
• Column (2) economic and educational variables by LEA from 1996 to 2002: 
unemployment rate for individuals under 25; the current, annual proportion of 
pupils eligible for free school meals (as a measure of area-level deprivation); 
full-time equivalent number of qualified teachers; percentage of pupils attaining 
no GCSEs at age 16; percentage of unauthorised half-days missed in secondary 
education; pupil-teacher ratio; and full-time equivalent number of 
supplementary staff for ethnic minorities. 
 
• Column (3) Census 2001 variables by LEA: the percentage of male working 
population in manufacture; the percentage of working population in low socio-
economic occupations; the percentage of the population under 25; the 
percentage of the population with no qualifications; the percent of ethnic 
minorities and the percentage of the population living in social housing. 
 
• Column (4) persistence in crime, or state dependence: this is included as the 
average of conviction rates pre-policy and the average total adult convictions in 
the area pre-policy. State dependence in crime, or past crime, has been shown to 
be an important determinant of current crime outcomes (Imai and Krishna, 
2004). 
 
• Column (5) area trends: to account for linear changes in crime by LEA over 
time.  
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Table 3: Regression analysis on 16 to 18 year olds’ conviction rates 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: Male Violent Crimes 
Ta 0.509
(0.227)**
0.122
(0.239)
0.065
(0.222)
-0.028 
(0.072) 
-0.209
(0.164)
Ta *policy-on -0.017
(0.179)
0.025
(0.198)
0.023
(0.202)
-0.077 
(0.172) 
-0.299
(0.191)
Dependent variable: Male Burglary 
Ta 1.991
(0.673)***
1.270
(0.556)**
1.301
(0.487)***
0.571 
(0.149)*** 
-0.256
(0.378)
Ta *policy-on -0.937
(0.377)**
-0.742
(0.388)*
-0.761
(0.387)*
-0.841 
(0.368)** 
-0.982
(0.504)*
Dependent variable: Male Theft  
Ta 6.723
(2.923)**
3.942
(2.569)
3.459
(2.401)
1.256 
(0.633)** 
-0.815
(0.813)
Ta *policy-on -1.977
(1.091)*
-1.038
(1.218)
-1.196
(1.196)
-1.953 
(1.143)* 
-2.184
(1.639)
Controls 
Economic variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Edu. Variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Census Variables No No Yes Yes Yes 
Avg. crime pre 
policy and adult 
crime 
No No No Yes Yes 
Yearly controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LEA trends No No No No Yes 
Number of Obs. 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 
Notes: Notation follows from equation (2), where Ta stands for areas that introduced the EMA 
programme and Policy-On indicates periods after the introduction of the EMA programme.  
Asterisks (*),(**),(***) represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Estimations 
are weighted by population. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by LEA. 
 
 
As we add controls in the regressions, the initial difference between areas becomes 
statistically insignificant. In other words, the estimation is indeed controlling for the 
initial between group difference between EMA and other LEAs prior to 1999. For 
theft, for example, just controlling for economic and educational variables reduces the 
initial difference between areas by nearly half (from 6.72 to 3.94) and this value 
(3.94) is not statistically significant at 10% level. Difference in the initial levels of 
burglary rates decreases from 1.99 to 1.27 when adding the economic and educational 
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controls. Notice that the incorporation of Census 2001 variables does not reduce this 
difference any further. This is because both educational and economic variables may 
have already captured the main differences between EMA and non-EMA areas.  
 
It may also be that there are differential pre-policy trends in observables and/or 
convictions. Thus, in column 4 we add pre-policy conviction rates to try and 
standardise for previously high conviction areas. This causes another significant 
reduction in the initial difference in burglary rates between EMA and non-EMA. 
Here, the difference is reduced to 0.57, but it is still significantly different from zero. 
Finally, by incorporating area trends, the initial difference in burglary rates becomes 
statistically insignificant whereas the difference-in-differences parameter remains 
statistically significant with a p-value of 0.054.2 There is a reduction of 0.98 in 
burglary rates in EMA areas relative to non-EMA areas in column 5.  
 
It is worth noting that the difference-in-differences estimate for theft shows a 
consistent reduction in EMA relative to non-EMA areas. For some specifications this 
parameter is significant (columns 1 and 4). The relatively low number of pilot LEAs 
makes statistical significance harder to achieve. Therefore, we do not imply that the 
lack of statistical significance implies the absence of effects, in particular in the case 
of theft.  
 
4.1 Extension of the EMA programme to other areas 
 
As mentioned in section 3.2, the EMA programme was extended to about one-third of 
all LEAs in England during 2001. We test the robustness of our results by estimating 
equation (2) excluding areas that introduced the EMA programme after 2001. These 
results are shown in Table 4 under Test 1. Column (A) shows estimated parameters 
for the model that includes the full set of controls, i.e. economic, educational, Census 
characteristics and initial conditions for conviction rates, whereas column (B) shows 
estimated parameters when trends are included as controls.  
 
In the case of burglary we find that the difference-in-differences estimator remains 
statistically significant – with a p-value of 0.052. The reduction in convictions for 
burglary in EMA areas relative to areas that did not pilot the programme is 0.88 
convictions per 1,000 pupils (column B in Table 4). For thefts the significant 
reduction of 2 convictions per 1,000 pupils (column A in Table 4) may be explained 
by area trends (column B in Table 4). 
 
Again, we find that there are no differences between convictions in EMA relative to 
other LEAs due to violent crimes.  
 
 
                                                 
2 The estimated parameter for male burglary (0.98) and associated standard error (0.50) is statistically 
significant at 10% level, as indicated in Table 3. However, the p-value (0.054) is closer to a 5% 
significance level than to a 10%. Given the few number of EMA areas (15) statistical significance is 
harder to achieve. Therefore, reporting the p-values where necessary seems reasonable and important to 
support the empirical argument.  
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Table 4: Verification: piloted areas versus non-EMA areas only 
 
TEST 1 TEST 2  
(A) (B) 
 
(C) (D) 
Dependent variable: Male Violent Crime 
Ta 0.096 
(0.102) 
-0.195 
(0.148)
Ta -0.037 
(0.072) 
-0.235 
(0.164)
Ta *policy-on -0.050 
(0.184) 
-0.290 
(0.193)
Ta *policy-on1 -0.034 
(0.169) 
-0.309 
(0.192)
Tb *policy-on2 -0.200 
(0.106)* 
-0.169 
(0.123)
Dependent variable: Male Burglary 
Ta 0.575 
(0.149)*** 
-0.021 
(0.399)
Ta 0.552 
(0.147)*** 
-0.250 
(0.381)
Ta *policy-on -0.953 
(0.303)** 
-0.880 
(0.490)*
Ta *policy-on1 -0.759 
(0.369)** 
-0.980 
(0.507)*
Tb *policy-on2 -0.387 
(0.178)** 
-0.046 
(0.225)
Dependent variable: Male Theft  
Ta 1.289 
(0.538)** 
-0.543 
(0.876)
Ta 1.198 
(0.621)* 
-0.945 
(0.819)
Ta *policy-on -2.196 
(1.201)* 
-2.211 
(1.658)
Ta *policy-on1 -1.688 
(1.141) 
-2.230 
(1.646)
Tb *policy-on2 -1.249 
(0.694)* 
-0.851 
(0.607)
 
Number of Obs. 1,707 1,707  2,373 2,373 
Notes: Notation follows from equation (3), where Ta stands for the original LEAs where the EMA 
programme was piloted in 1999 and Tb for areas where the programme was rolled over in 2001. 
Policy-On indicates periods after the introduction of the EMA programme with subscript 1 for the 
original 15 LEAs and subscript 2 for the LEAs where the programme was rolled over.  
Asterisks (*),(**),(***) represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Estimations 
are weighted by population. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by LEA. Columns (A) and 
(C) incorporate full set of controls whereas columns (B) and (D) also add area trends. 
 
 
The effect of the expansion of the EMA programme is also accounted by estimating 
equation (3). Under this estimation, the relative reduction in conviction rates is 
estimated for 15 EMA pilots versus other LEAs, and for the 15 EMA pilots plus 
extended LEAs that introduced the EMA programme in 2001 versus other LEAs. In 
other words, we divide the difference-in-differences estimator into original EMA pilot 
areas relative to the rest of the LEAs post 1999 and original EMA pilot areas plus 
expanded areas relative to other LEAs post 2001. Results from this estimation are 
shown in Table 4 under Test 2. Similar to the previous estimations, column (C) 
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presents estimated parameters from the model that incorporates the full set of controls 
whereas column (D) adds area trends. 
 
Our findings confirm the significant differences in burglary rates in EMA areas versus 
the rest of the LEAs post the introduction of the EMA programme (-0.76 burglaries 
per 1,000 pupils in column C). Interestingly, there is a significant difference in 
burglary and theft rates between EMA areas plus expanded EMA areas and the rest of 
the LEAs (-0.39 burglaries per 1,000 pupils and 1.25 thefts per 1,000 pupils in column 
C). However, only burglary rates fell significantly more in the original EMA areas 
relative to other LEAs, 0.98 less burglaries per 1,000 pupils in column D.  
 
4.2 Sensitivity analysis 1: burglary for older individuals 
 
So far, results show a significant reduction in conviction rates for burglary offences 
committed by 16 to 18 year olds in areas where the EMA programme was piloted 
relative to the rest of the LEAs. Still, one may attribute this relative reduction to a 
general reduction in burglary offences across the population. If this were the case, 
then difference-in-differences estimates for burglary rates for other age groups will 
also be statistically significant. We verify this issue by estimating the model first for 
individuals aged 19 to 21 (Table 5) and then for different age groups of the population 
(Table 6).  
 
In terms of convictions for burglary offences committed by 19 to 21 year olds, EMA 
areas have higher rates before the introduction of the programme than other LEAs. 
Similar to the analysis performed in Table 3, the introduction of controls in Table 5 
aims to standardise the baseline for these areas. By incorporating area trends in the 
estimation, the pre-policy difference in conviction rates is eliminated (column 5 in 
Table 5).  
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Table 5: Regression analysis: conviction rates for 19 to 21 year old males, 
burglary 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Ta 0.965 
(0.284)***
0.554 
(0.217)**
0.529 
(0.251)**
0.159 
(0.066)** 
0.251 
(0.224)
Ta *policy-on -0.498 
(0.138)***
-0.336 
(0.147)**
-0.386 
(0.145)***
-0.487 
(0.144)*** 
-0.009 
(0.352)
Controls 
Economic variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Edu. Variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Census Variables No No Yes Yes Yes 
Avg.crime pre policy 
and adult crime 
No No No Yes Yes 
Yearly controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LEA trends No No No No Yes 
Number of Obs. 2,772 2,772 2,772 2,772 2,772 
Notes: Notation follows from equation (2), where Ta stands for areas that introduced the EMA 
programme and Policy-On indicates periods after the introduction of the EMA programme.  
Asterisks (*),(**),(***) represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Estimations 
are weighted by population. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by LEA. Controls defined as 
in Table 3. 
 
 
Results from Table 5 show greater reduction in conviction rates due to burglary in 
EMA areas relative to non-EMA areas for 19 to 21 year old males. The difference-in-
differences estimator is statistically significant even with the inclusion of initial 
conditions for convictions (column 4). However, once we control for linear area 
trends, the effect completely disappears. For burglary offences by 19 to 21 year olds, 
initial pre-policy trends may explain the statistically significant difference-in-
differences estimator.  
 
We compare results for 19 to 21 year olds with those that we obtained for the age 
group that was directly affected by the EMA programme (16 to 18 years old). Figure 
2 shows estimated difference-in-differences parameters for these two age groups, with 
and without the inclusion of controls. Two issues are worth mentioning. First, the 
relative reduction in burglary rates for those aged 16 to 18 is nearly twice as large as 
for 19 to 21 year olds. Secondly, the difference-in-differences estimator for the 16 to 
18 year olds remains statistically significant even after the inclusion of area time 
trends, whereas it is reduced to nearly zero for the 19 to 21 year olds. This provides an 
indication that the EMA programme may be having an effect on reducing convictions 
for the 16 to 18 year olds. This reduction is larger and remains significant for this age 
group.  
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Figure 2: Difference-in-differences estimator using regression analysis, 
convictions for burglary offences only, 16-18 vs. 19-21 year olds 
 
 
 
 
Further, we investigate the relative reduction in conviction rates in EMA areas 
compared to other LEAs for males of different age groups. The difference-in-
differences estimate for burglary using equation (2) is re-estimated for males aged 20 
to 69. Table 6 shows that the relative difference between EMA and other LEAs in 
terms of burglary rates is not statistically significant for any of the groups. The values 
reported in Table 6 do not contain any controls for initial area differences.  
 
Table 6: Convictions for burglary offences by age groups 
 
 (20-29) (30-39) (40-49) (50-69) 
Ta 0.684 
(0.409)*
0.183 
(0.080)**
0.111 
(0.028)*** 
0.006 
(0.005)
Ta *policy-on 0.019 
(0.165)
0.043 
(0.041)
-0.032 
(0.035) 
0.005 
(0.006)
 
Number of Obs. 1,848 1,848 1,848 4,620 
Notes: Notation follows from equation (2), where Ta stands for areas that introduced the EMA 
programme and Policy-On indicates periods after the introduction of the EMA programme.  
Asterisks (*),(**),(***) represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Estimations are weighted by population and NO CONTROLS are included. Standard errors, in 
parenthesis, are clustered by LEA. 
 
 
We do find that burglary rates pre-1999 for individuals aged 20 to 49 were 
significantly higher in EMA areas than in the rest of the LEAs (Table 6). This result 
confirms our initial statement that EMA areas were also likely to be areas with high 
conviction rates. 
 
Burglary: difference-in-differences estimator 
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0 
0.5 
No Controls Edu&Eco Census Pre-crime Area trends
Convictions per 1,000 pupils
16-18 yrs
19-21 yrs
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4.3 Sensitivity analysis 2: the RBI  
 
One clear obstacle in the methodology is the fact that EMA areas are themselves 
likely to be, or already will have been, selected to implement other crime prevention 
initiatives. This is especially the case if, as we have seen before, EMA areas are also 
high crime areas. The case of burglary offers a unique opportunity to study this issue. 
Between 1999 and 2002, the Home Office introduced the RBI. The aim of this 
initiative was to reduce burglary nationally by targeting areas with the worst domestic 
burglary problems (Home Office, 2004). The Home Office invested around £25 
million in projects in areas that had a significant burglary problem. These areas or 
communities were defined as areas that had, at the time, a burglary rate of at least 
one-and-a-half times the national average at that time, i.e. 36 or more burglaries, 
including attempts, per year per thousand households. 
 
The RBI funded a total of 63 separate burglary reduction schemes in England and 
Wales. For England, these schemes were located in 60 LEAs. Projects were initially 
granted around £60,000 each, irrespective of the scale of the problem. In later rounds, 
applicants could bid for £100 for each burglary that occurred in the area or 
community over the previous 3 years. Early findings from an evaluation of 55 projects 
indicate that, on average, they reduced burglary by 20% (Kodz and Peace, 2003). 
Findings from 21 programmes in the Northern region of England show that the 
reduction in burglary was 10 percentage points higher than in the rest of country 
(Hirschfield, 2004). We verify here the impact of the RBI in terms of convictions. 
 
Of the 15 LEAs that piloted the EMA programme, 7 were also selected by the RBI 
(Gateshead, Lambeth, Leeds, Middlesbrough, Nottingham, Oldham, and Southwark) 
and 53 introduced the RBI only.  
 
Table 7 shows the difference-in-differences estimate for the relative reduction in 
conviction rates due to burglary offences between areas that implemented the EMA 
only, those that implemented the RBI only and those with both programmes, against 
the rest of the LEAs (equation 4).  
 
Several results are worth highlighting from Table 7. From column 1, EMA-RBI areas 
had the highest average pre-programme conviction rates: 2.87 more convictions per 
1,000 pupils than the rest of the LEAs. Areas where only the EMA was piloted had on 
average higher rates (1.49 convictions per 1,000 pupils) than the rest of the LEAs and 
higher than the compared average of RBI areas versus other LEAs (0.93 convictions 
per 1,000 pupils).  
 
We find that areas that only introduced the EMA programme do not differ in terms of 
initial levels of conviction rates (columns 2 to 5) or relative changes in rates to other 
LEAs (columns 1 to 5). Areas that introduced only the RBI have a relative change in 
convictions of about 0.5 convictions per 1,000 pupils (average between columns 1 to 
4). The initial difference between these areas and the rest of the LEAs disappears with 
the introduction of area-level economic and educational controls (column 2) and 
remains insignificant when more controls are included (columns 3 to 5).  
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Table 7: Difference-in-differences in burglary for EMA, RBI and EMA-RBI 
areas 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
TEMA 1.447 
(0.792)*
0.853 
(0.695)
0.742 
(0.536)
0.381 
(0.212) 
0.283 
(0.343)
TRBI 0.934 
(0.331)***
0.505 
(0.307)
0.348 
(0.297)
0.155 
(0.119) 
0.183 
(0.197)
TEMA-RBI 2.874 
(1.011)***
2.013 
(0.820)**
2.135 
(0.698)**
0.774 
(0.225)*** 
-0.541 
(0.559)
TEMA*policy-on -0.780 
(0.648)
-0.641 
(0.620)
-0.691 
(0.606)
-0.770 
(0.658) 
-0.137 
(0.603)
TRBI*policy-on -0.595 
(0.247)**
-0.477 
(0.255)*
-0.505 
(0.249)*
-0.534 
(0.234)** 
-0.048 
(0.295)
TEMA-RBI*policy-on -1.367 
(0.403)***
-1.087 
(0.479)**
-1.115 
(0.471)**
-1.215 
(0.357)*** 
-1.551 
(0.470)***
Controls 
Economic variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Edu. Variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Census Variables No No Yes Yes Yes 
Avg.crime pre policy 
and adult crime 
No No No Yes Yes 
Yearly controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LEA trends No No No No Yes 
Number of Obs. 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 
Notes: Notation follows from equation (4), where TEMA stands for LEAs where the EMA programme 
was piloted only, TRBI for areas where the RBI programme was introduced only and TEMA-RBI for areas 
where both initiatives were introduced. Policy-On indicates periods after the introduction of the 
initiatives.  
Asterisks (*),(**),(***) represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Estimations 
are weighted by population. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by LEA. Controls defined as 
in Table 3. 
 
 
The greater reduction in convictions occurs between areas that introduced the EMA 
and the RBI programme against the rest of the LEAs. In these areas, conviction rates 
fell between 1.1 and 1.5 convictions per 1,000 pupils more than the rest of the LEAs 
(columns 1 to 5). This result is significant even after the inclusion of area-level 
controls, initial conditions on convictions and time trends. It is the incorporation of 
time trends that reduce the initial difference in burglary rates measured by the 
parameter β to zero (column 5).  
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The relative change in convictions in areas that introduced the EMA programme as 
well as the RBI is more than twice the one estimated for areas that introduced only the 
RBI. This result supports the hypothesis that the EMA programme may have had a 
knock-on effect on burglary reduction and may have contributed to the overall 
reduction in convictions for burglary in these areas.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
This paper provides an empirical evaluation of the additional benefits that an 
educational programme, such as the EMA, may have in terms of crime reduction. The 
EMA programme was designed to increase participation in post-compulsory 
education and piloted in 15 LEAs in 1999. By providing financial support to youths 
from disadvantaged economic backgrounds, the EMA aimed to remove financial 
barriers to participation in education. 
 
Theoretically, it is expected that participation in education may contribute to crime 
reduction by increasing income and hence the opportunity cost to engage in criminal 
activities. Education may also improve parenting skills, which are important in the 
inter-generational transmission of advantage that may prevent young people from 
criminal involvement. Other mechanisms fostered by education are patience and risk 
aversion, which may also deter the likelihood of committing crimes. The EMA 
programme may have had additional economic incentives that could have further 
contributed to crime reduction since it provided income support for youths to stay-on 
in education after compulsory schooling. By raising income, youths may not have the 
short-term need to obtain income through illegal activities. 
 
We use area-level data on convictions for male juvenile burglary, theft and violent 
crimes (16 to 18 years old) from 1996 to 2002 to evaluate whether the EMA 
programme has had knock-on effects in terms of crime reduction. Using difference-in-
differences estimation techniques, our results show that male conviction rates for 
burglary and theft offences fell more in the 15 LEAs that piloted the EMA programme 
than in the rest of the LEAs in England. This did not occur with violent crime. The 
significant difference in burglary rates in EMA areas relative to non-EMA areas 
remains significant after controlling for area differences using economic, educational, 
Census indicators, pre-policy average crime rates and area trends. This is not the case 
for thefts. Therefore, there is an indication that areas where the EMA programme was 
piloted had a significant reduction in conviction rates for burglary that may have been 
due to the programme.  
 
We verify the potential bias in these estimates from the fact that the EMA programme 
was rolled-over to about one-third of the LEAs in 2001. We find that the extension of 
the programme does not seem to have had a significant effect on our estimates. 
Estimated difference-in-differences parameters for burglary and theft rates with and 
without controlling for the rolling-over of the programme were very similar.  
 
Our results raise two issues. First, if the EMA targeted 16 to 18 year olds, do we find 
significant difference-in-differences in convictions exclusively for this group or also 
across the whole population? Second, if EMA areas were selected due to low 
participation in post-compulsory education and have, on average, higher crime and 
conviction rates, is it possible that other crime prevention initiatives were in action in 
EMA areas? If so, is it the effect of other initiatives rather than the EMA programme 
what is driving our results? And finally, do we find increasing social benefits from the 
establishment of these two government programmes rather than each of them 
separately?  
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For the first of these issues, we assess whether the EMA had an impact on convictions 
for burglary for other age groups. Burglary convictions by 19 to 21 years old in EMA 
areas fall by relatively more than in other LEAs. However, this result may be 
explained by general area trends in burglary. For other age groups between 20 and 69 
years, we do not find difference-in-differences in conviction rates between EMA and 
non-EMA areas. What we do find is that, between 1996 and 1999, EMA areas have 
higher average conviction rates across most age groups than the rest of the LEAs. This 
result confirms the fact that EMA areas are also high conviction areas and therefore 
likely to have been selected for other government social programmes.  
 
The main finding of this paper is established when burglary reduction is evaluated for 
areas that introduced both direct targeting on burglary, the RBI, and the EMA 
programme. Between 1996 and 1999, these areas had 2.9 more convictions for 
burglary per 1,000 pupils than other LEAs. In these areas, burglary fell between 1.1 
and 1.5 convictions per 1,000 pupils relative to areas where these programmes were 
not introduced. At the rate of 1.1 less convictions, we estimate that it will take nearly 
6 years for conviction rates for burglary in these areas to reach the average of the 
other LEAs. 
 
For RBI action areas, burglary was reduced by 0.5 convictions per 1,000 pupils 
relative to other LEAs. Between 1996 and 1999, these areas had only 0.9 less 
convictions than other LEAs. Given the smaller difference in convictions between 
these areas and other LEAs, we estimate that at the rate of 0.5 less convictions it will 
take 3 years for these areas to reach the levels of other LEAs. Finally, we find a 
uniform pattern of conviction reductions in EMA areas relative to the rest of the 
LEAs. However, these estimates are not statistically significant, perhaps due to the 
low number of observations. Still, we estimate that at the rate of 0.7 less convictions 
in EMA areas relative to other LEAs, it may take up to 3 years to reach the levels of 
other LEAs.  
 
The importance of our result is highlighted by four factors. First, our indicator of 
crime is convictions. Not all crimes are prosecuted and convicted, only a proportion of 
total crimes. Therefore, the relative reductions found in this paper may be larger than 
estimated. Secondly, the relatively low number of LEAs that piloted the EMA 
programme implies that statistical significance is harder to achieve. In this paper we 
achieve statistical significance of the difference-in-differences estimator that is close 
to 5 percent. Thirdly, not all the individuals in the LEAs that piloted the EMA 
programme were entitled to receive financial support. Only those with a parental 
income less than £20,000 were entitled. Moreover, between 63% and 65% of eligible 
youths applied for EMA support. Therefore, our estimates of the potential effects of 
the EMA programme on crime reduction are biased downwards. Finally, areas where 
the EMA and the RBI programmes were introduced are those where our estimates are 
robust to the inclusion of all controls plus area trends. This provides a strong 
indication that it was not the RBI or the EMA that worked in isolation to prevent 
crime. Areas where these programmes were introduced were affected the most. 
 
In conclusion, we find clear grounds that the introduction of the EMA together with 
the RBI programme had significant and substantive effects on conviction rates for 
burglary offences by 16 to 18 year olds. Therefore, educational policies could have 
substantive external effects and could complement direct interventions for crime 
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prevention. Our findings raise the importance of the interconnectivity of departmental 
programmes. Crime prevention could be achieved not only by tough policing or 
increasing the number of officials but also by providing the police force with the 
information of alternative opportunities viable for youths. Therefore, a combination of 
programmes in deprived areas could have important social benefits for the population. 
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